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Case No. 20160485-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
DESEAN MICHAEL GOINS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, 370 P.3d 942 (Addendum A).  
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) 
(West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 
 Petitioner DeSean Goins separately accosted two homeless men in 
Pioneer Park with a knife.  Both victims testified at the preliminary hearing, 
and Goins cross-examined them without limitation.  Estrada did not appear 
for trial, and, despite diligent efforts, the State was unable to locate him.  
The trial court found Estrada unavailable and admitted his preliminary 
hearing testimony over Goins’ confrontation objection. 
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 Goins appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that 
confrontation was satisfied under Crawford v. Washington because Estrada 
was unavailable and Goins had both a prior opportunity and a similar 
motive to cross-examine him at the preliminary hearing.  
 The court of appeals’ ruling is consistent with a long, unbroken line of 
cases from both the United States Supreme Court and this Court holding 
that a preliminary hearing can afford an adequate opportunity for prior 
cross-examination.  Goins shows no compelling reason to depart from this 
precedent. 
 Through new counsel, Goins sought rehearing to challenge his 
appellate counsel’s effectiveness for failing to challenge on appeal trial 
counsel’s effectiveness in submitting an erroneous self-defense jury 
instruction.  The court of appeals properly denied the petition because it 
exceeded the scope of rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.  That 
decision is consistent with this Court’s long-standing precedent.  Goins 
remains able to pursue his ineffectiveness claims on post-conviction review. 
 While this Court could, in its discretion, decide to entertain Goins’s 
challenges on certiorari review, it should require that Goins pursue post-
conviction review, especially where his claims do not establish appellate 
counsel’s ineffectiveness.   
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 This Court granted review on two questions. 
 1.  “Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that a witness 
whose preliminary hearing testimony was admitted at trial was unavailable 
and that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that his Sixth Amendment 
right to confront witnesses against him was violated by the presentation of 
the preliminary hearing testimony at his trial.”  Order, September 12, 2016. 
 2.  “Whether the court of appeals erred in denying Petitioners petition 
for rehearing raising new arguments that trial and appellate counsel 
provided ineffective assistance.”  Order, September 12, 2016. 
 Standard of Review.  This Court reviews the court of appeals’ decision 
for correctness.  Brierly v. Layton City, 2016 UT 46, ¶18, ___ P.3d ___. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
 The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are 
reproduced in Addendum B:  
 United States Constitution, Amendment VI; 
 Utah Constitution, Article I, §12; 
 Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35; 
 Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 14; 
 Utah Rules of Evidence 804. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 
Gabriel Estrada (Count 3): 
 Gabriel Estrada needed a place to sleep and thought he would “be 
safe” at an apartment belonging to his friend Star and Petitioner Desean 
Goins.  R202:2-4, 9-10.  He slept at the apartment for several nights in July 
2013, but wasn’t comfortable being there long.  R202:9-912.   
 The morning of July 13, Estrada woke up, got ready, and left the 
apartment, heading for the men’s shelter in downtown Salt Lake City.  
R202:5-7, 10-11.  Goins and Star found him outside the shelter later that 
morning.  R202:4, 10-11.  Goins approached Estrada waiving a knife, 
cussing, and accusing him in “vulgar” language of taking Goins’s cell 
phone.  R202:6-7, 11-12.  Estrada denied taking the phone, told Goins it was 
Goins’s problem, and walked away.  R202:7, 12.   
Joshua Omar (Counts 1 and 2): 
 Joshua Omar was living at the men’s shelter in July 2013.  R167:121.  
He was “[v]ery close to Gabriel [Estrada] and considered him to be his 
“street son.”  R167:124-25.  Estrada, in turn, considered Omar to be his 
“street mother.”  R167:124.    
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 On July 13, 2013, Omar was sleeping on his blanket in Pioneer Park 
when his friend Star woke him up, asking if he had seen Estrada because 
Estrada allegedly had stolen Goins’s cell phone from Goins’s apartment.  
R167:121-24.  Goins, holding a sling bag and waiving a knife, started 
making the same accusations from ten or twelve feet away from Omar.  
R167:125-26; State’s Exh. 1.  But Goins moved closer as he spoke, 
threatening that Omar had “better tell the truth.”  R167:126.  When Goins 
stepped onto Omar’s blanket, he violated Omar’s personal boundaries, and 
Omar shoved him away.  R167:125, 127.     
 In response, Goins “attacked” Omar, lunging at the unarmed man.  
R167:127, 143, 154.  The two ended up on the ground wrestling and 
throwing punches at each other.  R167:127, 143-45, 154, 160-61.  At one 
point, Omar got on top of Goins and pinned him to the ground.  R167:127, 
140, 144.  Goins grabbed Omar’s right earlobe between his teeth, yanked his 
head back, bit off the earlobe, and spit it out on the ground.  R167:127-28; 
State’s Exh. 3, 4, 6-8.  Omar reached for his ear, saw the blood, and realized 
what had happened.  R167:128, 140-41.  He hit Goins once more, then stood 
up.  R167:129-30.   
 As Goins stood, he grabbed his knife from where it had fallen on the 
ground.  R167:141-42.  The two men yelled at each other and ran around the 
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blanket before stopping on opposite sides.  R167:130, 141-44.  Goins lunged 
twice at the unarmed Omar with the knife, stabbing him once on the upper 
left side of his torso.  R167:131, 139, 141, 145, 154, 156; State’s Exh. 9.  Omar 
then left to get help at the nearby police station while Star led Goins away 
from the park.  R167:129, 131, 155-56, 158. 
 As Donald Myers parked his car next to Pioneer Park, he noticed a 
fight between two men about ten feet away from his car.  R167:151-52.  He 
watched the men fight until he saw Goins holding a knife.  R167:152-55.  He 
immediately called 911.  R167:55.   It appeared to Myers that Omar was 
defending himself while Goins—who appeared motivated by anger and 
was yelling about a phone—was the aggressor.  R167:157, 159. 
 A responding officer stopped Goins and Star near the park and found 
a knife inside Goins’s bag.  R167:165-67.  He noted several “very small” cuts 
like scratches on Goins’s face suggesting that Goins had recently been in a 
fight.  R167:169-71.  Goins told the officer that he had been fighting with 
Omar, that he bit Omar’s ear to get Omar off of him, and that he stabbed 
Omar with the knife in self-defense.  R167:174-76. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
 The State charged Goins with two counts of aggravated assault, both 
third-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103(1) (West 
-7- 
Supp. 2014), and one count of second-degree felony mayhem, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-105 (West 2004).  R16-18.   
 The Preliminary Hearing.  Both victims testified at a preliminary 
hearing seven weeks after the charged assaults.  R23-24; R202.  Goins’ 
counsel cross-examined Estrada without objection by the State or restriction 
by the judge.  R202:2-13.  The prosecutor’s questioning spans about six 
pages; defense counsel’s cross spans five pages.  Id.  The judge found 
probable cause and bound Goins over as charged.  R23-24; R202:33.   
 Pre-trial.  Two months later, the parties appeared for the first day of 
trial only to discover they had no jury pool and could not proceed that day.  
R166:2-3.  The parties and the trial court decided to proceed with trial the 
next day, on what would have been day two of the originally scheduled 
trial.  R166:2-3.  The prosecutor then took the opportunity to acknowledge 
that Estrada had not appeared for trial and moved that he be declared 
unavailable and that his preliminary hearing testimony be admitted at trial 
the next day.  R166:3 (argument and ruling in Addendum C).  The 
prosecutor explained that because both victims in this case were homeless 
and had no phones, they were difficult to locate and required “creative” 
efforts.  R166:3-4; R167:16.  Accordingly, before the preliminary hearing, the 
prosecutor had used the Salt Lake City Bike Police to look for the men based 
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largely on a description of Omar’s missing earlobe.  R166:3-4.  Both men 
were found, appeared at the hearing, and brought with them a pastor from 
the K-2 Church who dealt with community outreach—getting to know the 
people in the area and helping them when needed.  Id.   The prosecutor took 
the opportunity to arrange for the pastor to be the contact person for both 
men so they could be notified through him of a trial date.  R166:4.  Both men 
agreed, and the prosecutor remained in contact with the pastor.  Id.   
 The prosecutor later emailed the subpoenas for both victims to the 
pastor, expressly including both days of the scheduled two-day trial.  
R166:4; R167:10, 16.  Thereafter, the pastor informed the prosecutor that he 
had, in fact, served both subpoenas on the victims and informed them that 
they needed to be at the trial.1  R166:4.   
 The prosecutor maintained contact with the pastor as trial neared to 
ensure that both victims were still available.  Id.  At one point, the pastor 
mentioned that Estrada had “come into some trouble” but was still around.  
Id.  The pastor left for a new job shortly thereafter, and the prosecutor dealt 
with the replacement pastor, Jason.  Id.   
 Jason verified that the previous pastor had served the subpoena on 
Estrada and that Estrada had been in jail.  Id.  When the prosecutor followed 
                                              
1 No return of service appears in the record. 
-9- 
up on the information, he found that Estrada had been released from jail 
nearly a month before trial.  R166:4-5.  The prosecutor checked the jail twice 
more before trial, but did not locate Estrada.  Id. 
 Both Jason and Omar later told the prosecutor that they had lost 
contact with Estrada.  Id.  Omar and Estrada had “a falling out,” and neither 
Omar nor Jason knew where to find Estrada.  R166:5.  Estrada stopped 
hanging around the area, was not involved with his normal “crowd,” and 
did not get in touch with either Jason or Omar.  R166:5.  Although the 
prosecutor requested that Jason watch for Estrada, Jason did not see him in 
the days leading up to trial.  Id.   
 Goins accepted the prosecutor’s proffer of his efforts to serve Estrada 
and get him to appear at trial and argued that they were insufficient under 
rule 804, Utah Rules of Evidence.  R166:6, 12.  He also argued that 
permitting use of Estrada’s preliminary hearing testimony would violate 
Goins’s constitutional right to confrontation because the motive for cross-
examination at the preliminary hearing was different than would exist at 
trial, where credibility was a factor.  R166:9-11.   
 The judge found that Estrada was unavailable under rule 804.  
R166:12.  Specifically, the judge found that the State utilized a “reasonable 
means of process,” its efforts succeeded in actually informing Estrada of the 
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trial dates, and Estrada was present at the preliminary hearing and, thus, 
knew that the proceedings were moving forward.   R166:12-13.   
 Further, the judge found that Goins enjoyed a meaningful 
opportunity for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing where his 
counsel actively examined Estrada without objection or restriction and 
asked about the “exact incidents” that were at issue at trial.  R166:18-19.  
Rule 804 requires nothing more, she noted.  R166:19.  Accordingly, the judge 
held that Estrada’s preliminary hearing testimony could be used at trial 
without violating Goins’s constitutional confrontation rights.  Id.   
 Trial.  At trial the next day, Estrada again failed to appear.  R267:3-4.  
Goins unsuccessfully renewed his objection to admission of Estrada’s 
preliminary hearing testimony.  Id.  The jurors heard an audio tape of 
Estrada’s testimony during the State’s case.  R167:149-50.  After a day of 
testimony, they acquitted Goins of mayhem, convicted him of aggravated 
assault involving Omar, and convicted him of the lesser offense of using or 
threatening to use a dangerous weapon in the fight with Estrada.  R73, 75-
76; R168:52.   
 Court of Appeals’ decision.  Goins timely appealed, arguing both (1) that 
Estrada was not “unavailable” where the State made no good faith effort to 
locate him and to properly serve him with a subpoena; and (2) that he did 
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not have the requisite opportunity or similar motive to fully cross-examine 
Estrada at the preliminary hearing. Aplt.Br. 5-16. Goins argued that the 
preliminary hearing was an inadequate opportunity for cross-examination 
for three reasons:  the absence of a right to confront witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing; the limited purpose of a preliminary hearing; and the 
different motive his counsel possessed for cross-examination at the 
preliminary hearing.  Id.  
 The court of appeals—consistent with its own, this Court’s, and 
United States Supreme Court precedent—disagreed.  Goins, 2016 UT App 
57, ¶¶8-20 (in Add. A).  The court first explained that Utah law requires that 
the State make “every reasonable effort” to procure the witness but did not 
require  that “’every lead, no matter how nebulous,’” “’be tracked to the 
ends of the earth.’”  Id. at ¶¶9-10, 14 (quoting Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331 
(10th Cir. 1974)).  Comparing this case with precedent from both Utah 
appellate courts, the court of appeals determined that the State “went to 
considerable effort” in this case to obtain Estrada’s testimony at trial, 
including maintaining a connection with Estrada through a person whom 
he trusted, getting a subpoena to Estrada through that person, and, after 
Estrada disappeared, trying to locate him through the most likely means 
possible, right to “the eve of trial.”  Id. at ¶¶10-13, 15.  The court also 
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acknowledged that in addition to the State’s reasonable actions, Goins 
acquiesced in both the State’s method of keeping in touch with Estrada and 
the means of serving him a subpoena.   Id. at ¶15.  Consequently, the court 
determined that the State made the necessary reasonable efforts to locate 
Estrada and affirmed the finding of unavailability.  Id.  
 The court also rejected Goins’s challenge to the preliminary hearing 
itself.  First, the court explained that preliminary hearing testimony of an 
unavailable witness was admissible at trial under rule 804(b)(1)(B), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, because the circumstances of a preliminary hearing 
“’closely approximat[e] those’” of a typical trial.  Id. at ¶16 (quoting 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970)).  Further, the court held that the 
rule required the opportunity for cross-examination, not the exercise of that 
opportunity, and that a preliminary hearing provides “an effective 
opportunity for confrontation.”  Id. at ¶¶17-18.  Goins had that opportunity 
in this case.  Id. at ¶18.   
 Finally, the court of appeals sympathized with Goins’s claim that the 
limited purpose of the preliminary hearing—determination of probable 
cause—dictated a motive for her cross-examination at that hearing that 
differed from the motive she would later have at trial.  Id. at ¶19.  But the 
court found the argument foreclosed by this Court’s decision in State v. 
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Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), which Goins did not address.  Id. at ¶¶19-
20.  Because Brooks rejected identical arguments and held that both 
proceedings involved the motivation of establishing the innocence of the 
accused, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s admission of 
Estrada’s preliminary hearing testimony.  Id. at ¶20. 
 Rehearing petition.  Goins obtained new counsel and filed a petition for 
rehearing, urging the court of appeals to consider new issues:  the accuracy 
of a self-defense jury instruction, ineffective assistance of trial counsel for 
proposing the instruction, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for 
not challenging the instruction and trial counsel’s effectiveness on direct 
appeal.  Rehearing Pet. 3-11.  The court of appeals sought input from the 
parties about the propriety of raising new issues in a rehearing petition 
(Order dated April 25, 2016), then denied the petition without elaboration 
(Order dated May 17, 2016).    
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Issue I:  Goins argues that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed 
the use of Estrada’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial.  He claims 
Estrada was not unavailable because: (1) Estrada was not formally 
subpoenaed; and (2) the preliminary hearing did not provide Goins an 
opportunity for cross-examination with a motive similar to that used for 
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trial.  His claim that the limited nature of the preliminary hearing renders 
any opportunity for cross-examination inadequate contradicts over a 
century of precedent from the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and 
the court of appeals.  Goins provides no compelling reason to depart from 
this precedent.  Instead, the long, unbroken line of precedent provides that 
his opportunity to cross-examine Estrada at the preliminary hearing 
satisfied the confrontation clause.  Thus, Goins does not show that the use at 
trial of Estrada’s preliminary hearing testimony violated Goins’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses.  
 Issue II:  The court of appeals properly denied Goins’s rehearing 
petition which sought review of new claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
and appellate counsel.  The new claims were outside the scope of rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because they were neither “overlooked” 
nor “misapprehended” by the court of appeals in its published decision.   
Further, the court’s decision was consistent with long-standing decisions 
from this Court.  Finally, a procedure already exists for presentations of 
Goins’s claims which he should follow.  Because the court of appeals 
properly denied the rehearing petition, this Court should affirm without 
proceeding further. 
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 Should this Court proceed, it could, but should not, consider the 
merits of Goins’s new claims because a remedy already exists and because 
the claims establish no reversible error to justify unusual any treatment.   
 In any event, Goins establishes neither deficient performance nor 
prejudice in the handling of jury instruction 24 regarding self-defense.   
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT ESTRADA WAS UNAVAILABLE AT TRIAL AND 
THAT GOINS HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE HIM AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
 Goins argues that the court of appeals erroneously affirmed the 
admission of Estrada’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial.  Pet.Br. 9-32.  
He contends that use of the testimony violated his right to confrontation 
guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions because: (1) the witness 
cannot be unavailable where the prosecution failed to formally subpoena 
him; and (2) the preliminary hearing did not provide the requisite 
opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness as required by rule 804, Utah 
Rules of Evidence.  Id.    
 Goins is mistaken on both points.  First, formal service of a subpoena 
is not a mandatory prerequisite to a finding of unavailability; rather, the 
State must merely make every reasonable effort to produce the witness.  The 
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prosecutor used ample reasonable means to procure the homeless witness’s 
attendance at trial, including but not limited to informal service of a 
subpoena.  The finding of unavailability was, therefore, correct. 
 Second, not only Brooks, but a long unbroken line of decisions from 
both the United States Supreme Court and this Court show that preliminary 
hearing testimony can be admissible at trial where the declarant is 
unavailable. Goins offers no compelling reason to depart from that 
precedent.   
A. Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant 
has long been admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an 
accused’s right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” at trial.  
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 590.  
But this right is not absolute.  The Confrontation Clause does not bar the use 
of all hearsay at trial, but only of “testimonial” hearsay.  Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  A hearsay statement is “testimonial” if, 
in making it, the declarant “bears testimony” against a defendant. Id. at 51. 
Testimonial hearsay includes, among other things, “prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 59, 68. 
 But even testimonial hearsay is admissible at trial if (1) the declarant 
is unavailable to testify and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
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cross-examine the declarant regarding the prior statements.  Id. at 68.  Prior 
testimony—whether given at a prior trial or a preliminary hearing—has 
long been admissible where these conditions are met.  Id. at 57 (citing 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241 (1895)); see also State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 403 (1994).   
 Rule 804(b)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, expressly provides for the 
admission of prior testimony if both conditions are satisfied.  Utah R. Evid. 
804(b)(1); State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶17, 314 P.3d 1014, cert. denied 
320 P.3d 676 (2014).  It states that a witness is unavailable if, as is relevant 
here, he “is absent from the trial” and the State “has not been able, by 
process or other reasonable means, to procure the [witness’s] attendance.”  
Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5); Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶17.  It “’must be 
practically impossible to produce the witness in court.  It is not enough to 
show that the witness would be uncomfortable on the stand or that 
testifying would be stressful.  Every reasonable effort must be made to 
produce the witness.’”  State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ¶15, 84 P.3d 1183 
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(quoting State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1113 (Utah 1989)); see also State v. 
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah App. 1990).2  
B.  The absent, homeless witness was unavailable to testify at 
trial. 
 Goins contests the court of appeals’ determination that the 
prosecution made every reasonable effort to procure Estrada’s attendance at 
trial.  Pet.Br. 11.  He claims that Estrada was not unavailable because the 
State never sought to “actually serve a subpoena upon him” by 
“conventional means.”  Id. at 10-11.  But formal service of a subpoena is not 
a prerequisite to an unavailability finding, and Goins fails to challenge the 
reasonableness of the other efforts the prosecution made to keep tabs on 
                                              
2 Goins claims that this unavailability standard is “perhaps” even 
“more stringent” than the federal standard under the Confrontation Clause, 
and that the federal Confrontation Clause standard itself requires a 
“stronger showing of unavailability and reliability than does evidentiary 
Rule 804.”  Pet.Br. 14-15.   
Goins is mistaken.  First, his sole support for a “stronger” federal 
constitutional standard is dicta in a footnote in a Fifth Circuit case saying 
the Confrontation Clause “may” require a stronger showing of 
unavailability and reliability than does federal rule 804.  Id. at 14 (citing 
Ecker v. Scott, 69 F.3d 69, 72, n.3 (5th Cir. 1995)).  But Ecker neither develops 
nor applies a “stronger showing” for unavailability.  
Second, the state standard Goins labels “more stringent” than the 
federal standard is actually the federal standard—Webb based its holding on 
its reading of federal precedent.  See 779 P.2d at 1113.  Goins cites no case 
interpreting the standard more stringently than the federal standard from 
which it derives.  Thus, Goins provides no basis for a separate state 
constitutional review, and this Court should proceed under the standard 
recited above.  See Drawn, 791 P.2d at 893, n2. 
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Estrada and ensure his presence at trial, including: repeatedly checking with 
the pastor to ensure both Estrada’s continued presence in the area and his 
continued link to the prosecutor through the pastor; repeatedly checking the 
jails once informed Estrada was having trouble and had been arrested; 
alerting those who were familiar with Estrada and were most likely to see 
him to watch for him; and making a final check with the jail the eve before 
trial.  Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ¶14.     
 It has long been true in Utah that Rule 804(a)(5) does not require “’a 
patently futile attempt to serve a subpoena on a potential witness … whose 
physical location and address are completely unknown.’”  Id. at ¶10 
(quoting Brown v. Harry Heathman, Inc., 744 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Utah App 
1987)).  The Heathman court expressly rejected a claim that under the rule, 
the proponent of such testimony “must always attempt service of process.”  
744 P.2d at 1018.  As Heathman noted, the rule itself is phrased in the 
disjunctive:  a witness is deemed “unavailable” where the party sought to 
procure the witness’s attendance “by process or other reasonable means.”  
Id. (quoting Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5)) (emphasis added).  See also State v. 
Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 645-46 (Utah 1995) (finding efforts to be satisfactory 
without service of process).  Goins acknowledges this law, but fails to 
discuss or refute it, and offers no contrary authority expressly requiring 
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formal service of process as a prerequisite to all unavailability 
determinations under the rule.  Pet.Br. 11. 
 Goins claims that the prosecution ignored two opportunities to 
attempt formal service on Estrada, and thereby fell short of the effort 
required to establish unavailability.  Id. at 11-13.  But Goins has not 
established that service by “conventional means” was even possible.  The 
fact that the pastor was able to serve Estrada does not show that an officer 
would “surely” have succeeded in attempting to do the same.  Id. at 12.  
Estrada was homeless.  His physical location and address were never 
known and he had no phone.  No one knew where to find him at any given 
time.  The prosecutor was not aware of his presence in the jail until after he 
had been released.  R166:4-5.  Unlike Omar, Estrada had no distinctive 
attributes to enable officers to locate him, and there was no reason to believe 
he would allow officers to approach him.  Reliance on the pastor was the 
most likely avenue of successful service and, hence, was reasonable under 
the circumstances.   
 In any event, the issue is not whether additional avenues of service 
were available to the prosecutor; it is whether the prosecutor’s efforts were 
reasonable.  See Utah R. Evid. 804(a)(5); see also Menzies, 889 P.2d at 403.  
Even accepting Goins’ view that the pastor’s service on the witness was 
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flawed, the pastor’s effort clearly qualified as “other reasonable means” 
which in fact accomplished what “proper” service would have 
accomplished, informing the witness of the time and place of trial and his 
need to attend.  See Utah R. Evid. 801(1)(5).  That was the proffer given by 
the prosecutor, accepted by Goins, and credited by the judge, who 
acknowledged that the witness’s actual knowledge of the information was 
“key” to her ruling.  R166:12-13.  That was all the constitution requires.   
 In this Court, for the first time, Goins argues that the court of appeals 
should have reversed the trial court’s unavailability finding because the 
prosecution failed to give timely notice of the witness’s expected 
unavailability.  Pet.Br. 16-17.  This claim does not warrant review, not only 
because it was not timely raised, but because it lacks support. See DeBry v. 
Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) (refusing to address on certiorari review 
a claim not raised in the court of appeals or originating in that court’s 
challenged decision).  It rests solely on a Massachusetts case dealing with a 
witness who was deemed unavailable due to illness.  Commonwealth v. 
Housewright, 25 N.E.3d 273, 283 (Mass. 2015) (reversing the unavailability 
finding for reasons other than the lack of notice).  The analysis in that case 
has no bearing on the availability of the homeless witness in this case. 
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 The State need not demonstrate that it did everything humanly 
possible to procure the presence of a witness at trial; it need only use 
“reasonable means” to procure his attendance.  Utah R. Crim. P. 804(a)(5); 
Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶17.  The prosecution’s conduct under the facts 
here meets that standard.  Accordingly, the court of appeals properly 
affirmed the trial court’s determination that Estrada was unavailable at trial. 
C.  Preliminary hearings can provide an adequate opportunity for 
cross-examining a witness who is later deemed unavailable at 
trial. 
 Goins argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that the 
preliminary hearing provided the requisite “opportunity and similar 
motive” to develop cross-examination of Estrada for purposes of both rule 
804 and the Confrontation Clause.3  Pet.Br. 19-31.  He argues that the nature 
and purpose of the preliminary hearing in Utah differs substantially from a 
trial, that defense counsel often pursue their cross-examination at a 
preliminary hearing with motives which are wholly dissimilar to their 
motives for cross-examination at trial, and that the viability of the per se rule 
in Brooks that was relied on by the court of appeals in their decision in this 
case is “heavily in doubt.”  Id.   
                                              
3 It should be noted that Goins’s trial counsel conceded that he had 
the opportunity to examine Estrada at the preliminary hearing and 
proceeded to challenge only the motive for the examination.  R166:10; 
Pet.Br. 19.   
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 Goins is mistaken.  Not only Brooks, but a long, unbroken line of 
decisions from both the United States Supreme Court and this Court show 
that preliminary hearing testimony can be admissible at trial where the 
declarant is unavailable.  Because Goins offers no compelling reason to 
depart from that precedent, this Court should refuse to do so. 
1.   Preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable declarant 
has long been admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause. 
As to cross-examination, the Sixth Amendment guarantees only the 
opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination”) (emphasis added).  As this Court 
has long recognized, even where a defendant “may have elected to forgo 
cross-examination” that “does not mean that the opportunity was not 
available.”  State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Utah 1986); see State v. Pecht, 
2002 UT 41, ¶39, 48 P.3d 931; State v. Jolley, 571 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah 1977); see 
also Barger v. Oklahoma, 238 F. App’x. 343, 346-47 (10th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Williams, 116 F. App’x. 890, 891 (9th Cir. 2004); Simmons v. State, 234 
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. App. 2006); People v. Williams, 181 P.3d 1035, 1061 
(Cal. 2008); People v. Yost, 749 N.W.2d 753, 774-75 (Mich. App. 2008); State v. 
Artis, 215 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Mo. App. 2007).   
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Thus, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee cross-examination 
will take place at all, let alone “cross-examination that is effective in 
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”  United 
States v. Owens 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (citations omitted); Pecht, 2002 UT 41, 
¶39; see also People v. Cowan, 236 P.3d 1074, 1126 (Cal. 2010) (“Nothing in 
Crawford casts doubt on the continuing vitality of Owens.”).  Whether a prior 
opportunity is “adequate” depends on the facts of a case.   
Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have long held 
that the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness may be 
admissible at trial.4  More than a century ago, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed this possibility in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 
(1985).  Mattox was convicted of a murder in Indian territory.  Id.at 239.  His 
conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was tried a second time, which 
                                              
4 The Supreme Court excluded the preliminary hearing testimony of 
an unavailable witness in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08 (1965). But the 
problems in Pointer—that Pointer lacked counsel at the preliminary hearing 
and the government made no attempt to procure the out-of-state witness—
are not present here. Other Supreme Court cases excluding preliminary 
hearing testimony on confrontation grounds have generally involved 
circumstances—also not present here—where the declarant was not truly 
unavailable.  See id.; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (preliminary 
hearing testimony inadmissible where State did not seek presence); Motes v. 
United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900) (witness unavailable due to negligence of 
government); see also State v. Oniskor, 510 P.2d 929 (Utah 1973) (preliminary 
hearing testimony inadmissible at trial where State had not proven 
unavailability).  See Point IB, supra. 
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resulted in a hung jury.  Id. at 251.  By the time of his third trial, two of the 
witnesses against him had died.  Id. at 240.  The trial court permitted those 
witnesses’ prior testimonies—in the form of reporter’s notes—to be read at 
Mattox’s third trial.  Id.  He was convicted and appealed, claiming that 
admission of this prior testimony violated his confrontation rights.  Id.   
In holding the testimony admissible, the Supreme Court noted that 
“the authority in favor of the admissibility of such testimony, where the 
defendant was present either at the examination of the deceased witness before 
a committing magistrate, or upon a former trial of the same case, is 
overwhelming.” Id. at 242 (emphasis added). In support, the court favorably 
cited more than a dozen lower court cases, including one in which “the 
substance of a deceased witness’ testimony given at a preliminary 
examination was held to be admissible.”  Id. (citing United States v. Macomb, 
5 McLean 286, Fed. Cas. No. 15,702). 
 The court explained that the “primary object” of the confrontation 
clause was “to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits … being used 
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination 
of the witness,” which was met by prior sworn testimony.  Id.  The court 
understood that its holding would “deprive[]” a defendant “of the 
advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the 
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law has designed for his protection,” but noted that the general rule “must 
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities 
of the case,” and that letting the guilty walk free because their accusers were 
no longer available “would be carrying his constitutional protection to an 
unwarrantable extent.  The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may 
be preserved to the accused.”  Id. at 243.  Thus, confrontation was satisfied 
“in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face, and 
subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination.”  Id. at 244 (emphasis 
added).  This was so even though the court upheld the exclusion of some 
impeachment evidence against a deceased witness that had been discovered 
after trial.  Id. at 244-49. 
Mattox’s holding has been reaffirmed for more than 100 years.  
Though its language was broad enough to include preliminary hearings, the 
Supreme Court first addressed preliminary hearings specifically nearly fifty 
years ago in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970). 
 In Green, a minor named Porter sold marijuana to an undercover 
officer.  399 U.S. at 151.  After Porter was arrested, he named Green as his 
supplier. Id. Porter later testified for the State at Green’s preliminary 
hearing, where he was cross-examined by defense counsel.  Id.  At trial, 
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Porter again testified, but became “markedly evasive and uncooperative,” 
claiming that he had forgotten who his supplier was.  Id. at 151-52 (citation 
and quotation omitted). The court admitted Porter’s preliminary hearing 
testimony to impeach him.  Id. at 152. The California Supreme Court held 
that admitting Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony violated Green’s 
confrontation rights.  Id. at 153.  
 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The court acknowledged 
that one virtue of having a witness testify at trial was that the jury could 
“observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement,” which 
would aid “the jury in assessing his credibility.”  Id. at 158.  But the court 
cautioned that this direct observation was not the be-all and end-all of the 
Confrontation Clause—while it “may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statement if it could somehow be 
whisked magically back in time to witness” it, the Constitution did not 
require that.  Id. at 160-61.   
 Granted, Porter actually testified at Green’s trial, and was subject to 
cross-examination on his prior statements.  Id. at 161-62.  But the Court’s 
holding was not limited to that circumstance—the Court explained that 
“Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony was admissible” under the 
Confrontation Clause even if Porter had not testified at trial, because his 
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preliminary hearing statement was “given under circumstances closely 
approximating those that surround a typical trial,” which included: 
• Porter was under oath; 
• Green was represented by counsel; 
• Green’s counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Porter on his statements to police, without any significant 
limitation; and 
• the proceedings were held in front of a judge.   
Id. at 165-66.  Under these circumstances, the preliminary hearing was not 
“significantly different from an actual trial” for confrontation purposes, and 
the preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible even if 
Porter had been unavailable to testify at trial.  Id. (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. 
257).   
 Green was decided before both Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and 
Crawford, which set out the current confrontation requirements.  But both 
Roberts and Crawford show Green’s continuing validity.   
 Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen 
credit cards from a Bernard Isaacs.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58.  One of the 
witnesses for Roberts at the preliminary hearing was Anita Isaacs—
Bernard’s daughter—who let Roberts stay at her apartment.  Id.  Anita 
denied giving Roberts permission to use her father’s checks and credit 
cards.  Id.  At trial, Roberts claimed that Anita had given him the financial 
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instruments “with the understanding that he could use them.”  Id. at 59.  
Anita was not available to testify at trial, so the State introduced her 
preliminary hearing testimony to rebut Roberts’ claim.  Id. 
 Like the California court in Green, the Ohio Supreme Court in Roberts 
held that prior preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause because there was “little incentive to cross-examine a 
witness at a preliminary hearing, where the ultimate issue is only probable 
cause.”  Id. at 61 (citation and quotation omitted).  The Supreme Court 
reversed and re-affirmed Green, explaining that the preliminary hearing 
afforded an “adequate opportunity to cross-examine.”  Id. at 73 (citation 
omitted). 
 True, the Roberts court also held that hearsay statements of an 
unavailable declarant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause so 
long as they bore “adequate indicia of reliability.”  Id. at 66 (quotation 
omitted).   And the Supreme Court later abandoned this test in Crawford in 
favor of the two-element test of (1) unavailability and (2) prior opportunity 
for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 60. But Crawford itself noted that Roberts’ 
result likely survived, even if its test did not.  Id. at 58 (“Even our recent 
cases, in their outcomes, hew[ed] closely to the traditional line. [Roberts] 
admitted testimony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had 
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cross-examined the witness.”).  And like Roberts, Crawford re-affirmed Green 
and Mattox. Id. at 57 (citing Green and Mattox for proposition that 
“preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine”).  Further, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), made clear that cross-
examination need not even necessarily take place—the defendant need only 
have the opportunity to cross-examine.  Id. at 559.   
This Court has repeatedly affirmed the admission of an unavailable 
witness’s preliminary hearing testimony, most recently last year.  Mackin v. 
State, 2016 UT 47, ¶¶38-42, __ P.3d __; Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402-03; State v. 
Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913-14 (Utah 1988); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 540-42 
(Utah 1981).  In Brooks, four transients fought each other in the “hobo 
jungle” over $14.  Brooks, 638 P.2d at 538.  Two of the men were charged 
with aggravated assault, and the other two testified against them at a 
preliminary hearing, where they were cross-examined. Id. When the victims 
were later declared unavailable, their prior testimony came in at trial over 
Brooks’s confrontation objection.  Id.  
This Court affirmed under the Roberts reliability test, which governed 
confrontation clause questions at the time, but explained that the reliability 
of the testimony sprang from a preliminary hearing, “with all its formalities 
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and protections.” Id. at 540-41.  And it rejected Brooks’s argument that 
preliminary hearings did not afford an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine based on the limited nature of the hearing, explaining that the 
defense’s “motive and interest are the same” at both preliminary hearing 
and trial—to establish the defendant’s innocence.  Id. at 541.    
This Court also held prior preliminary hearing testimony admissible 
in both Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913-14, and Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which 
were decided under Roberts. And this Court most recently affirmed the 
admission of prior preliminary hearing testimony under Crawford in Mackin, 
2016 UT 47, ¶¶40-42.   
The court of appeals has followed suit.  See State v. Pham, 2016 UT 
App 105, 372 P.3d 734, cert granted, 384 P.3d 567 (Sept. 12, 2016); West Valley 
City v. Kent, 2016 UT App 8, 366 P.3d 415; Garrido, 2013 UT App 245. This 
Court has approved this course. See Mackin, 2016 UT 47, ¶39 (holding that 
Garrido is “[c]onsistent” with Crawford and Menzies).  And at least three 
federal circuits and seven other states have similarly held preliminary 
hearing testimony of an unavailable witness admissible under the 
confrontation clause. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 
2004); Glenn v. Dallman, 635 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1980); United States ex 
rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1981); People v. Williams, 
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181 P.3d 1035, 1061 (Cal.App.4th 2008); State v. Vinhaca, 205 P.3d 649 (Haw. 
2009); State v. Young, 87 P.3d 308, 316-17 (Kan. 2004); State v. Aaron, 218 
S.W.3d 501, 517 (Mo. App. 2007); Chavez v. State, 213 P.3d 476, 479 (Nev. 
2009); State v. Henderson, 136 P.3d 1005, 1011 (N.M. App. 2006); Primeaux v. 
State, 88 P.3d 893, 905-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004); see also United States v. 
Williams, 116 Fed.Appx. 890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding deposition 
testimony admissible under confrontation clause); Simmons v. State, 234 
S.W.3d 321, 326 (Ark. App. 2006) (same); Yost, 749 N.W.2d at 774-75 (same).  
2. Goins has shown no compelling reason to depart from 
this long-established, and correct, precedent. 
 Notwithstanding this extensive authority, Goins asks this Court to 
reverse a century-old course and hold that preliminary hearings—due to 
their limited purpose—are inadequate to afford a defendant the 
opportunity to cross-examine a witness.  Pet.Br. 10-32.  This Court should 
decline to do so. 
 It is true that preliminary hearings take place early on in a case and 
are generally limited to determining whether probable cause exists.  Id.  It is 
also true that there is no right to confront witnesses at preliminary hearings, 
and that the State may choose to present written statements in lieu of live 
testimony.  See Utah R. Evid. 1102; Timmerman, 2009 UT 58.  But where the 
State elects to present live testimony, defendants do have a rule-based right 
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to cross-examine. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(1). And magistrates have an ability—
albeit limited—to determine credibility.  State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶24, 137 
P.3d 787 (“Magistrates may make credibility determinations in preliminary 
hearings, but the extent of those determinations is limited.”).  Where the 
prior opportunity to challenge credibility exists, confrontation is satisfied.  
See, e.g., State v. Stano, 159 P.3d 931, 945 (Kan. 2007) (holding no 
confrontation violation from admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
where defendants are not barred from cross-examining witnesses at 
preliminary hearing on credibility); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 485 (similar). 
 Further, however limited a particular preliminary hearing may be, the 
one here had those characteristics that the Green court held “closely 
approximat[ed] those that surround a typical trial”—Estrada was under 
oath; Goins was represented by counsel; defense counsel had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Estrada without limitation; and the 
proceedings were held in front of a judge. Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ¶16. See 
Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66; see also Menzies, 889 P.2d 403 (holding preliminary 
hearing testimony reliable where it was “given under oath before a judge 
and Menzies was represented by counsel who had the opportunity to cross-
examine” the witness).   
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 In arguing to the contrary, Goins relies largely on (1) the 1995 
amendment of Utah Constitution, article I, section 12; and (2) People v. Fry, 
92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).  Neither is persuasive. 
 After this Court decided Brooks, the Utah Constitution was amended 
to make clear that the purpose of preliminary hearings was to determine 
probable cause, and that reliable hearsay was admissible.  See Pham, 2016 
UT App 105, ¶17 n.3.  This overturned this Court’s decision in State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), which held that there was a state 
constitutional right to cross-examine at preliminary hearings.    
 But these changes did not affect the federal constitution nor the 
aspects of preliminary hearings that the United States Supreme Court has 
held ensure an adequate opportunity for cross-examination—a witness 
under oath, a judge, defense counsel, and cross-examining without 
significant limitation.  Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66.   
 Goins also cites to People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).  Pet.Br. 27-29. 
But Fry is unpersuasive.  There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
because preliminary hearings in that state are limited to probable cause 
findings, they could not afford an adequate prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  Id. at 977.  But as shown, the United States Supreme Court 
rejected this very sort of reasoning as far back as Mattox and as recently as 
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Green. And, again, whatever the limits of preliminary hearings generally, 
the one here retained the characteristics that both the United States Supreme 
Court and this Court have held most critical—an oath, a judge, a witness 
able to be cross-examined without significant limitation, and a defendant 
represented by counsel.   
 And, in Brooks, this Court explicitly rejected the very case on which 
Fry relied—People v. Smith, 597 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1979).  Fry cited Smith for the 
proposition that “due to the limited nature of the preliminary hearing, the 
opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy the 
Confrontation Clause.” 92 P.3d at 977.  Brooks directly rejected Smith’s 
reasoning, holding that defense counsel’s “motive and interest are the 
same” at both preliminary hearing and trial” and that “cross-examination 
takes place” at both “under the same motive and interest.”  638 P.2d at 541.  
See also Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (“At the preliminary hearing and trial, 
Defendant was charged with the same crimes, he had the same defense 
counsel, and the same opportunity and motive to cross-examine” the 
witness); State v. Mohamed, 130 P.3d 401, 405 (Wash. App. 2006) 
(“Mohamed’s interest at the pretrial hearing was the same as it would have 
been at trial, and equally pressing: to establish [victim’s] recantation as 
credible and prove that her out of court statements were unreliable.”).  As 
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the court of appeals noted here, the arguments rejected on this issue in 
Brooks were identical to those raised by Goins in the court of appeals.  Goins, 
2016 UT App 57, ¶20.   
Further, other courts have almost universally rejected Fry’s reasoning.  
Most of the courts addressing Fry have either distinguished it or outright 
declined to follow it. This is because Fry’s extreme outcome results in “a 
blanket prohibition of preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable 
witness”—which the “majority of courts do not condone.” State v. Mantz, 
222 P.3d 471, 477 (Idaho App. 2009); see, e.g., People v. Thompson, case no. 
C058768, 2009 WL 4758792, *14 (Cal. App. 3d. Dec. 14, 2009) (refusing to 
follow Fry)(unpublished); State v. Nofoa, 349 P.3d 327, 339–40 (Haw. 2015) 
(refusing to follow Fry’s “complete ban on preliminary hearing” testimony 
in favor of reviewing each decision on “case-by-case basis”); Stano, 159 P.3d 
at 945 (refusing to follow Fry where defendants can cross-examine state 
witnesses at preliminary hearings and have similar motives to trial); State v. 
Aaron, 218 S.W.3d 501, 516 (Mo. App. 2007) (refusing to follow Fry despite 
defendant’s admittedly different “interest and motive in his cross-
examination” at preliminary hearing); Chavez, 213 P.3d at 484-85 (refusing to 
follow Fry); Henderson, 136 P.3d at 1010 (refusing to follow Fry and holding 
that counsel had same motive and interest both at preliminary hearing and 
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at trial); Mohamed, 130 P.3d at 402, 404-05 (refusing to follow Fry because 
defendant had similar motive and prior opportunity to cross-examine); see 
also O’Neal v. Province, 415 Fed.Appx. 921, 923–24 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
lower court because preliminary hearing afforded sufficient opportunity for 
prior cross-examination); Parker v. Jones, 423 Fed.Appx. 824, 831–32 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Hargrove, 382 Fed.Appx. 765, 779 (10th Cir. 
2010) (affirming lower court even “if defendant’s cross-examination of 
witness at the preliminary hearing was narrow in scope and would have 
been conducted differently” if counsel knew the witness would be 
unavailable at trial); Bowman v. Neal, 172 Fed.Appx. 819, 828–29 (10th Cir. 
2006) (affirming lower court’s admission of preliminary hearing testimony 
even when limitations were placed on defense counsel’s prior cross-
examination).   
 Goins seeks to support his position by citing to State v. Stuart, 695 
N.W.2d 259 (Wis. 2005).  Pet.Br. 25. But Stuart did not support establishment 
of a per se ban on using preliminary hearing testimony.  It merely stated that 
when a cross-examination is in fact restricted on credibility issues, a 
confrontation problem could arise if the prosecution later tried to use that 
testimony at trial.  Id.at 266.  That is not this case. Whatever potential 
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limitations may be imposed by individual magistrates in a given case, none 
occurred here.   
Goins also presses a number of policy arguments, none of them 
persuasive.  He alleges that if defense counsel were required to fully cross-
examine at preliminary hearings, “there may be little time left for judges to 
conduct actual trials.” Pet.Br. 29.  He supports his assertion of procedural 
mayhem by providing a compilation of felonies for which preliminary 
hearings were scheduled in 2015.  Pet.Br. at separately bound Appendix. He 
then proceeds to provide his “best guess” and “conjecture” as to the 
amount, in hours, of judicial time that would be dedicated to preliminary 
hearings in which defense counsel took full advantage of the opportunity to 
cross-examine every witness.  Id. at 29-30.  His compilation does not account 
for a number of relevant factors—e.g., the number of preliminary hearings 
waived in 2015 or already including cross-examination of all key 
witnesses—and fails to consider the number of cases in which “every” 
witness would truly need to be cross-examined.  Id. Goins acknowledges 
and excuses the potential inaccuracies in both the data and the estimates, 
using the information simply to demonstrate the impracticality of cross-
examining every witness in every preliminary hearing.  Id. at 30.   
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But, practically speaking, not every defense counsel would choose to 
cross-examine every witness: they simply have the opportunity to do so.  
And there remain witnesses for whom cross-examination should always 
occur, e.g., those who are homeless, terminally ill, seriously mentally ill, 
suicidal, drug-addicted, and active-duty military subject to combat 
deployment.  Goins, 2016 UT App 57, ¶18, n7.  The fact remains, the 
preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness has been 
admissible at trial in Utah since Maddox, Green, or at very least, Brooks.  The 
intervening decades have not created unmanageable caseloads.   
Goins’ remaining concerns present no barrier to use of the 
preliminary hearing testimony in appropriate circumstances.  It has long 
been certain that such testimony could be admissible if the declarant was 
unavailable and the defendant had counsel and was able to cross-examine 
the witness.  To the extent a magistrate in another case might limit cross-
examination, Pet.Br. 25-27, that did not happen here.  In any event, an effort 
by a magistrate to significantly limit cross-examination on credibility issues, 
or by the State to present reliable hearsay in lieu of live testimony, see Utah 
R. Evid. 1102, would present this Court with a much different case and 
defense counsel with a much stronger argument for exclusion of the 
testimony from trial.    
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 Further, a defense counsel’s decision to curtail potentially beneficial 
avenues of questioning for whatever reason, Pet.Br. 25, does not eliminate 
the opportunity to cross-examine.  See Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶¶18, 20 
(Garrido’s Sixth Amendment rights not violated by admission of victim’s 
preliminary hearing testimony at trial because Garrido had requisite 
opportunity for cross-examination at preliminary hearing, despite counsel’s 
decision to forego it).   
Goins also asserts that later-discovered evidence often impacts cross-
examination at trial, and that a preliminary hearing conducted before all 
discovery is available to the defense necessarily renders the prior 
opportunity inadequate.  Pet.Br. 31.  But this Court rejected that very 
contention in Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402-03, which Goins does not even cite.  
Menzies’s former cell mate, Walter Britton, testified at Menzies’s 
preliminary hearing that Menzies confessed to killing the victim.  Id. at 401.  
At trial, Britton became uncooperative and refused to testify, despite the 
court holding him in contempt.  Id.  The trial court ruled Britton unavailable 
and admitted his preliminary hearing testimony.  Id. at 401-02.  
On appeal, Menzies argued a confrontation violation, based in part on 
his inability to cross-examine Britton using convictions that occurred 
between preliminary hearing and trial.  Id. at 403.  This Court affirmed, 
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explaining that while it “agree[d] that new evidence obtained after the 
hearing may have aided an attack on Britton’s credibility on cross-
examination, the preliminary hearing transcript indicate[d] that the issue 
was well-explored.”  Id.    
 Goins argues for the first time that application of Utah Constitution, 
Art. I, section 12 and rule 804(a)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence, violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the federal constitution and the Uniform 
Operation of Laws provision of the state constitution.  Pet.Br. 26-27.  But in 
the absence of any mention of exceptions to the preservation rule, this Court 
should decline to entertain the claim.  See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶13, 95 
P.3d 276 (This Court generally “will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial 
court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances”).5     
 Goins’s arguments ignore the fact that it is Goins—not the State—
who seeks to change the law. He has not met his heavy burden of 
convincing this Court that a long line of authority stretching back more than 
                                              
5Alternatively, the issue fails for inadequate briefing because Goins 
does not include any meaningful analysis, as required by rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.  See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (outline the 
requirements of an adequate brief); State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶22, 128 P.3d 
1179. 
-42- 
a century—and approved by this Court as recently as last October—has 
become unworkable or was incorrectly decided in the first instance.  See 
generally Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398-99.  Preliminary hearing testimony of an 
unavailable declarant should remain generally admissible absent 
exceptional circumstances, such as where a magistrate significantly limits 
cross-examination on credibility issues. 
Finally, there is an important policy reason to reject Goins’s blanket 
approach.  In fairness to the State and victims, a defendant should not walk 
free merely because a victim has become unavailable after being cross-
examined at a preliminary hearing.  As the Mattox court explained, “To say 
that a criminal … should go scot free simply because death has closed the 
mouth of” the victim “would be carrying his constitutional protection to an 
unwarrantable extent.  The law, in its wisdom, declares that the rights of the 
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order than an incidental benefit may 
be preserved to the accused.”  156 U.S. at 243.   
Those “incidental benefits” included “testing the recollection and 
sifting the conscience of the witness” and “compelling him to stand face to 
face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge his 
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony 
whether he is worthy of belief.” Id. at 242-43.  Cf. Green, 399 U.S. at 160 
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(rejecting confrontation claim based on admission of preliminary hearing 
testimony even though it “may be true that a jury would be in a better 
position to evaluate the truth of the prior statements if it could somehow be 
whisked magically back in time to witness a grueling cross-examination” at 
the time of the statement).   
Thus, the Supreme Court has struck a necessary balance and explicitly 
recognized the need to consider fairness not only to a defendant, but to the 
State and to victims.  Fairness concerns are particularly acute in domestic 
violence and gang cases, where it is lamentably common for victims to 
become uncooperative—and thus unavailable—out of fear of the defendant, 
a misplaced sense of love or loyalty, or some other factor outside the State’s 
control.  See, e.g., Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, ¶¶4, 23-26 (discussing domestic 
violence victim’s lack of cooperation with prosecution stemming from fear).  
Those same concerns support rejection of Goins’s assertion of a blanket 
prohibition on the use at trial of an unavailable witness’s preliminary 
hearing testimony.   
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3. Admitting the unavailable victim’s cross-examined 
preliminary hearing testimony did not violate Goins’s 
confrontation right. 
 Applying the long-established precedent previously described to this 
case, this Court should hold that Goins has not shown a violation of his 
confrontation right.  
Goins points to no defect in or limitation of the cross-examination that 
took place at preliminary hearing. His cross-examination of the witness—a 
known transient—was entirely unfettered.  Though he suggests that 
discovery was not complete at the time of the preliminary hearing, Pet.Br. 
22-23, he does not point to any evidence that later came to his attention that 
he would have used had the victim appeared at trial.  Thus, Goins has not 
shown that the preliminary hearing in his case did not afford him an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the victim, and this Court should 
affirm.  
D.  Any error in the court of appeals’ decision concerning use of 
Estrada’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial would be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 Should this Court find that the use at trial of Estrada’s preliminary 
hearing testimony violated Goins’s confrontation rights, it should still 
affirm his felony conviction because the error would be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
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 Goins urges reversal because Estrada’s testimony was “vital” to the 
State’s case on both his felony and misdemeanor convictions. Pet.Br. 17-18.  
Instead, any error would be prejudicial only as to Goins’ class A 
misdemeanor conviction for using a knife against Estrada.  See Goins, 2016 
UT App 57, ¶6, n5.  His was the only testimony offered with regard to the 
misdemeanor charge, R167:5-6, requiring reversal if it were found to have 
been erroneously admitted.   
 Estrada’s testimony was not relevant to the felonious assault on 
Omar.  His comments about Goins’ possession of the knife and Goins’ 
attitude before finding Omar would have had little, if any, impact on the 
conviction for assaulting Omar because: (1) Estrada did not witness the 
assault; (2) Omar’s vivid testimony was independently corroborated by an 
eyewitness who watched almost the entirety of the altercation; and (3) 
further corroboration derived from photographs depicting the significant 
injuries inflicted on Omar and the minor scratches suffered by Goins.  See id.  
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II. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DENIED GOINS’S 
REHEARING PETITION BASED ON RULE 35 AND 
PRECEDENT FROM THIS COURT; REGARDLESS, THE 
CLAIMS DO NOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF GOINS’S PRIOR COUNSEL  
 Goins claims that the court of appeals erroneously denied his 
rehearing petition in which, with the benefit of new appellate counsel, he 
raised new claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.6  
Pet.Br. 33-39.  He contends that the claims warranted consideration on 
rehearing under rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, because prior 
appellate counsel’s failure to raise the claims caused the court of appeals to 
“overlook” them.  Id. at 33-35.  He further argues that the court should have 
reached the merits of the claims because they could be reviewed and 
decided on the existing appellate record.  Id. at 34.   
 But a rehearing petition is not an appropriate vehicle for raising 
claims for the first time on direct appeal.  To permit Goins to do so would 
exceed the scope of the rule’s plain language and conflict with the long-
standing decisions of this Court. 
                                              
6 Goins appropriately limits this issue to the charges relating to Omar.  
Pet.Br. 32.   
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A.  The court of appeals properly refused to hear a new claim 
raised for the first time in a rehearing petition. 
 Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a petition 
for rehearing “shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which 
the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended” in 
rendering its decision in a direct appeal.  Utah R. App. P. 35(a). 
 Goins contends that he properly presented his new ineffectiveness 
claims in a rehearing petition because his original appellate counsel’s failure 
to raise the claims in the direct appeal caused the court of appeals to 
“overlook” the claims. Pet.Br. 37.  By this reasoning, a rehearing petition 
would be an appropriate means to raise any claim not presented to the court 
of appeals in the first instance. 
 The court of appeals properly rejected Goins’s untimely attempt to 
include new claims in his appeal for several reasons.  First, review of 
Goins’s claims is outside the scope of rehearing proceedings.  The plain 
language of the rule expressly permits rehearing in cases where the Court 
“has overlooked or misapprehended” points of law or fact in rendering its 
decision. Utah R. App. P. 35(a).  This language focuses on the integrity and 
consistency of this Court’s decisions on the issues before it when it wrote 
those decisions: a court cannot overlook or misapprehend a matter that was 
never presented to it.  Thus, denial of the rehearing petition was in keeping 
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with the court of appeals’ deference to this Court’s rule-making authority. 
See, e.g., State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118, 1122 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing 
supreme court’s authority for drafting appellate rules and refusing to adopt 
interpretation of appellate rule that exceeded the rule’s plain language). 
 Second, the court of appeals’ denial of the petition is consistent with 
long-standing decisions from this Court holding that the rule does not 
provide a vehicle for presentation of new claims.  See Nebeker v. Summit 
County, 2014 UT App 244, ¶60, 338 P.3d 203 (refusing to consider challenge 
raised for first time in rehearing petition); Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 
678, 681 (Utah 1982) (denying rehearing of new theory presented in 
rehearing petition); Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 P. 832, 837-38 
(1924) (refusing to consider new issue in rehearing petition that appellant 
did not previously raise); Swanson v. Sims, 51 Utah 485, 498, 170 P. 774, 778 
(1918) (same); Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) (rehearing 
will not be granted unless the court failed to consider some material point, 
erred in its conclusions, or is presented with a material discovery which was 
unknown when the case was argued).  Cf. Met v. State, 2016 UT 51, ¶63 n.16, 
___ P.3d ___ (refusing to consider new argument raised in 24(j) letter). 
 Third, none of Goins’s policy arguments justifies an exception to the 
rule.  Despite his statements to the contrary, Goins’s new claims are neither 
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“timely” nor “ripe.”  Pet.Br. 36-37.  His new claims are not “timely” raised if 
they may not, by rule, be raised in a rehearing petition.  The fact that the 
petition itself was timely-filed provides no justification for review of matters 
outside the scope of rule 35.   
 Goins’s belief that his claims are “still ripe” overlooks the fact that 
they will remain “ripe” when pursued by the “more familiar method” for 
reviewing such claims: post-conviction review under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act [“PCRA”].  See Order (citing Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, 279 
P.3d 396, and Landry v. State, 2012 UT App 350, 293 P.3d 1092).  The PCRA 
expressly provides that “a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that 
the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the 
failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.”   
Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-106(3) (West Supp. 2015).  This exception would 
allow Goins to avoid the procedural bar of the PCRA and obtain post-
conviction review of his new claims by demonstrating his claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  See Ross v. State, 2012 UT 93, ¶45, 
293 P.3d 345.  The fact that Goins would have to hire counsel, proceed pro se, 
or seek counsel willing to present his case pro bono is not unique to Goins 
but is of concern to every defendant pursuing this method of review.  
 Goins’s appeal to fairness, judicial economy and efficiency does not 
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bring his claims within the procedural framework by which this Court has 
decided such matters may be pursued. Pet.Br. 37.  Especially where, as here, 
the claims lack merit, it is hard to see that either justice or judicial economy 
will be served by dictating that the court of appeals should have ignored 
rule 35 and granted review of the claims on rehearing. 
 Further, there is no fair comparison of Goins’s attempt to present a 
new, untimely ineffectiveness claim with use of a rule 23B remand to 
present a timely ineffectiveness claim: the latter is expressly provided for by 
appellate rule while the former is not.  Pet.Br. 38-39.   
 Finally, this Court’s decision in State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 
(Utah 1991), does not establish error in the court of appeals’ denial of 
Goins’s rehearing petition.  Pet.Br. 38.  Humphries involved this Court’s 
decision to provide discretionary review of a new claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel in the context of a petition for writ of 
certiorari.  818 P.2d at 1029.  It did not speak to the court of appeals’ exercise 
of its discretionary review under rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
 In any event, rule 35 does not provide for presentation and review 
new claims, and the court of appeals did not err in so interpreting the rule 
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in this case.  As there was no error in the denial of the rehearing petition, 
further review unnecessary. 
B. This Court should refuse to review the new claim on certiorari. 
 Should this Court accept Goins’s invitation to reach the merits of his 
new claims for the first time on certiorari review, there is precedent to do so.  
See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1991), abrogated on other grounds 
in State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92.  In Humphries, this Court 
granted certiorari to review a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct and 
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the 
error.  Id. at 1028-30.  The Court held that review was appropriate because 
the new claims were “raised in a second tier of appellate review by new 
appellate counsel,” and the record and briefs included all evidence and 
argument which might be made on the matter.  Id. at 1029.   
 This Court may, in its discretion, undertake such a review.  See Utah 
R. App. P. 46(a).  But it should not do so because this case is distinguishable 
from Humphries and is not entitled to the same consideration.  In Humphries, 
the State candidly acknowledged the existence of reversible error that the 
State was willing to concede in a post-conviction proceeding, justifying 
circumvention of the usual procedure for remedying the new claim.  818 
P.2d at 1029.  Here, there is no reversible error (see argument, infra), and the 
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procedure for addressing Goins’s new claims should be no different than 
the established procedure applied to all other claims raised following 
issuance of a decision on direct appeal. 
C.  In any event, Goins’s new claims do not establish ineffective 
assistance. 
 In the end, this Court’s review is unwarranted because trial counsel’s 
performance was not deficient, and if it was, it was not prejudicial and, 
hence, would not have resulted in reversal had appellate counsel raised the 
claim on appeal. See Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶211, 344 P.3d 581 
(ineffectiveness of appellate counsel for not raising a claim requires proof of 
“a genuine issue of material fact” regarding whether appellate counsel 
overlooked an issue which is obvious from the trial record and…which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal”). 
 Ineffective assistance requires a defendant to prove both (1) deficient 
performance and (2) prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
694 (1984).  Proving the deficient performance element requires a defendant 
to overcome the “strong presumption” that counsel acted reasonably.  Id. at 
689.  This presumption is overcome only where a defendant can show that 
no reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did.  See, e.g., State v. 
Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, ¶35, 317 P.3d 968 (holding no deficient 
performance for not introducing evidence where record did not show that 
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“no reasonable attorney would have failed to introduce it into evidence”).  
Further, deficient performance must be “a demonstrable reality,” not a 
“speculative matter.”  State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶30, 253 P.3d 1082.  This 
Court must “presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware, and 
any inadequacies, “ambiguities, or deficiencies” in the record regarding 
counsel’s performance are “simply … construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively.”  Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶17.   
 The challenged jury instruction was proffered by defense counsel 
below and provided: 
 You are instructed that the laws of Utah do not require a 
defendant to establish self-defense by a preponderance or 
greater weight of the evidence.  The laws of Utah require the 
defendant to bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-
defense.  If the defendant has done this, and if such evidence of self-
defense, when considered in connection with all other evidence 
in this case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt 
then you must find him not guilty. 
 The defendant has no particular burden of proof but is 
entitled to an acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence from 
either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 
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R102 (emphasis added) (in Addendum D) (jury instr. 24).7  Goins argues 
that the instruction erroneously informs the jury that he is “solely” 
responsible to “bring forward some evidence which tends to show self-
defense.”  Pet.Br. 41, 43-44.  He explains that the case law instead permits 
either party to present such evidence.  Id. at 40-42.  This error, he claims, 
permitted the jury to determine that because the State, not Goins, brought 
forward the evidence showing self-defense “in the first instance,” the 
affirmative defense was inapplicable.  Id. at 42-43.   
 The instruction accurately sets out the parties’ respective burdens of 
proof relative to the affirmative defense except in one sentence which 
requires defendant to bring forward some supporting evidence.  R102.  
Goins correctly observes that the initial evidence triggering a self-defense 
claim may come from either party. See State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 934 
(Utah App. 1991) (addressing similarly-worded instruction, noting the 
evidence may be “introduced by defense or prosecution”), overruled on other 
grounds in State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993).  This fact alone, 
however, does not establish that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 
                                              
7 Goins inadvertently recites his own proposed jury instruction 
instead of the instruction given by the trial court and thereafter states that 
the trial court used that instruction.  Pet.Br. 29, 41.  The trial court altered 
the proposed instruction by eliminating part of it and thereafter used the 
altered instruction.  Compare R60 with R102.   
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 Review begins with the “strong presumption” that counsel acted 
reasonably.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  To defeat the presumption, Goins 
must show that no reasonable attorney would have done what counsel did.  
See, e.g., Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, ¶35.   He cannot do so on this record. 
 When counsel submitted the instruction, trial was approaching, 
counsel had identified the potential witnesses, and she had every reason to 
fully anticipate offering evidence on which to pursue the planned 
affirmative defense.  R35-70.  She clearly knew that self-defense evidence 
was a prerequisite to advancing the planned defense, and she knew that she 
needed to paint Omar as the aggressor at the beginning of his interaction 
with Goins, show that Omar put Goins in a position where the only means 
of self-defense he had was to bite Omar, then elaborate not only on Omar’s 
combative state of mind but on his escalated impulse to “make Desean 
bleed, too.”  R202:27-30; R168:41-44.  Having been through the preliminary 
hearing and seen a snapshot of the State’s case, defense counsel’s 
anticipation of the need to introduce, elaborate on, or highlight the evidence 
necessary for the self-defense claim would be entirely reasonable.  Where 
counsel reasonably expected to adduce at least some of the necessary 
evidence at trial, her inclusion of the challenged sentence in her proposed 
jury instruction was not unreasonable.  Counsel thereafter produced such 
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evidence at trial, reasonably refusing to rest on the prosecutor’s direct 
examination of the witnesses.  Counsel’s actions are entirely reasonable, 
and, under these circumstances, it cannot be said that no reasonable 
attorney would have included the challenged sentence in the jury 
instruction.   
 Even when instructions are “improper, confusing, or have the 
potential to mislead the jury,” the defendant claiming ineffective assistance 
must still show prejudice—a reasonable likelihood of a different result 
absent the error.  State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶42, 355 P.3d 1031.  Goins’s 
ineffectiveness claims fail because he fails to present a prejudice argument.  
He simply restates the standards for establishing prejudice for his trial and 
appellate claims, but presents no analysis regarding why, absent his trial 
counsel’s actions, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result.  
Pet.Br. 46-47.  See Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ¶152. 
 In any case, Goins cannot make this showing because the challenged 
sentence in jury instruction 24 was not prejudicial where Goins actually 
adduced vital parts of the self-defense evidence.  See id. at 934-35.  See also 
Haston, 811 P.2d at 934 (finding similarly-worded instruction harmless 
because Haston adduced part of the affirmative defense evidence).  
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 The jury was told that Goins needed to “bring forward some evidence 
which tends to show self-defense.”  R102.  They were not instructed that he 
was “solely” responsible for adducing such evidence or that he needed to 
“bring forward” the evidence “in the first instance,” as Goins claims.    
Pet.Br. 41, 43-44.  Neither were they told that Goins had any burden to 
establish that the evidence proved self-defense.  R102. 
 Goins did exactly as the instruction purported to require—adduced 
evidence tending to show self-defense.  For example, the State called Omar 
as its first witness and established that he was the first to make physical 
contact when he pushed Goins for stepping on his blanket and that he 
thereafter sought to hurt Goins when he saw his own blood after losing his 
earlobe.  R167:125-31.   
 Defense counsel added to this evidence in cross and re-cross 
examination of Omar, introducing Omar’s preliminary hearing testimony 
and defense-favorable phraseology. See, e.g., R167:143 (Omar’s prior 
testimony that he was already “pissed” at Goins before he touched the 
blanket); R167:140-41 (Omar’s prior admission that when he saw his own 
blood, he “went crazy again,” wanting “to try to make things even” and “to 
make [Goins] bleed, too”); R167:140-45 (Omar’s prior explanation that he 
not only tried to make Goins bleed, but then chased him while trying to 
-58- 
punch him). The misstatement in instruction 24 is unlikely to prompt the 
jury to ignore defense counsel’s efforts and reject his self-defense claim 
either because Goins did not “bring forward some evidence” of self-defense 
or because he did not do so before the State did.  See Haston, 811 P.2d at 934. 
 Neither is the misstatement likely to have affected the jury’s 
perception of the ultimate burden of proof. See Pet.Br. 43 (stating the 
instruction gave the State a “free pass in its burden to prove the defendant 
guilty”). This Court views the instructions as a whole to determine if they 
“fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case,” and can affirm 
even where “one of the instructions, standing alone is not as accurate as it 
might have been.”  State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235, ¶15, 359 P.3d 1272 
(quotation, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Haston, 
811 P.2d at 934.   
 Here, instruction 24 expressly and accurately stated that Goins was 
not required to establish self-defense “by a preponderance or greater weight 
of the evidence.”  R102.  The same instruction also explained that the jury 
must acquit Goins if there was “any basis in the evidence from either side 
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Instruction 25 expressly stated 
that it was “the prosecution’s burden to prove that the defendant did not act 
in self-defense” and that it must do so “beyond a reasonable doubt”  R103.  
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Each of the relevant elements instructions also directed that the State must 
prove all elements, including that “Goins did not act in self-defense,” 
beyond a reasonable doubt. R91, 92, 97 (jury instr. 13, 14, 19). And both 
parties correctly argued in closing that the State bore the burden of proving 
that Goins did not act in self-defense.  R168:33-34, 43-44.   
 Under these circumstances, Goins cannot establish the requisite 
prejudice for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective—a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result absent the misstatement in instruction 24.  See 
Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶42 (even when instructions are “improper, confusing, 
or have the potential to mislead the jury,” a defendant claiming ineffective 
assistance must still show prejudice).  Therefore, his claim that appellate 
counsel was ineffective necessarily fails.  See Menzies, 2014 UT 40, ¶211 
(appellate counsel is ineffective for not raising a claim only if “a genuine 
issue of material fact” exists regarding whether appellate counsel 
overlooked an issue which is obvious from the trial record and…which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal”). 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals and its denial of Goins’s rehearing petition. 
 Respectfully submitted on January 6, 2017. 
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